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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

IF IT’S TUESDAY, THIS MUST BE PROCREATION:
METHODOLOGY AND SUBJECT-MATTER IN FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT PEDAGOGY

WILLIAM D. ARAIZA*
In the 1969 movie, If It’s Tuesday, This Must Be Belgium, a busload of
American tourists is whisked through Europe on a nine-country, eighteen-day
tour of the continent that leaves them more confused than enlightened. The title
is based on a 1957 New Yorker cartoon, in which two women standing next to a
tour bus in the shadow of an Italian campanile consult an itinerary, one of them
insisting: “But if it’s Tuesday, it has to be Siena.” The movie and the cartoon
make the same joke: first-time visitors to Europe are thrown onto a bus and
driven across a countryside that appears only as a blur, and they receive only the
shallowest of information from their tour guide and itinerary.
Constitutional law classes in American law schools can feel the same way.
The sheer number of topics to be covered (nine countries) in a relatively small
number of units (eighteen days) imposes enormous pressure on the
professor/tour guide to move quickly, pointing out landmarks along the way
while barely slowing down. Of course, alternatives to such tours exist. Most
notably, a professor can provide a curated tour, sharply limiting coverage in a
way that allows students more time to focus on the topics and cases the professor
chooses to retain on the itinerary. But just like curated tours of Europe, this
approach to teaching constitutional law in general (and the Fourteenth
Amendment in particular) deprives the first-time student/tourist of a
comprehensive introduction to the subject. Such truncated coverage may impact
students’ future understanding, by failing to introduce them to topics and thus
narrowing the foundation upon which they ultimately build that understanding.
But there is an alternative. My casebook 1 focuses on methodologies of
constitutional decision-making, rather than using topics or subject-matter as its
primary organizing tools. As this Essay explains, the Fourteenth Amendment is
particularly well-suited for this pedagogical approach. Fourteenth Amendment
* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. Professor Araiza’s most recent book is ANIMUS: A
SHORT INTRODUCTION TO BIAS IN THE LAW (2017). Professor Araiza wishes to thank the Saint
Louis University Law Journal for inviting him to contribute to Teaching the Fourteenth
Amendment.
1. WILLIAM D. ARAIZA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES, APPROACHES, AND APPLICATIONS
(2016).
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doctrine is marked by fundamental disagreements among the Justices on how to
analyze and decide cases. Organizing the material around the methodological
grounds the Justices debate allows professors to provide coverage that is both
comprehensive and comprehensible—akin to organizing a tour of Europe
according to architectural periods rather than the happenstance of simply being
in Siena on Tuesday.
I. THE BENEFITS—AND DRAWBACKS—OF A TOPICAL APPROACH
In most American law schools, Fourteenth Amendment pedagogy in an
introductory constitutional law class takes a familiar path, in that any given class
will focus on a topic—for example, the due process right to sexual intimacy or
the equal protection right against discrimination based on alienage. This topicby-topic approach has real benefits. It organizes the material in a way that
students will intuitively grasp. It allows the professor to provide the black-letter
rule governing that topic. It also provides a template for easy assessment on the
final exam, as the professor can test the student on a fact pattern involving a
topic, which in turn allows the student to demonstrate her mastery of both the
content and the standard IRAC (Issue/Rule/Application/Conclusion) template.
And, of course, the Justices’ opinions themselves employ this topical focus—
for example, Justices speak of the Court’s “abortion jurisprudence.” 2
Nevertheless, something important is lost when instruction, and
instructional materials, are organized by topic. Most importantly, this approach
isolates cases, treating each topic as its own self-contained unit. (Hence, the
comparison to the confused tourist who knows nothing about Siena except that
she happens to be there at that moment.) It thus discourages students from
seeking connections between different topics, or from contextualizing the
Court’s doctrine on a topic within its broader jurisprudence. As a result, it also
discourages students from learning about the evolution of the Court’s thinking
on Fourteenth Amendment issues.
Consider substantive due process. Materials that simply walk the student
through the various topics addressed by the canonical modern substantive due
process cases—contraception, 3 abortion, 4 family structure, 5 sexual intimacy, 6

2. E.g., Gonzalez v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 169 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring).
3. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
4. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 116 (1973).
5. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 113 (1989); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431
U.S. 494, 495 (1977).
6. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190
(1986).
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assisted suicide, 7 and marriage 8—risk siloing those cases unless the instructor,
essentially fighting the casebook, makes a conscious effort to encourage the
student to think more broadly. Teaching materials can encourage that siloing in
several ways. Most explicitly, materials that subdivide the chapter by topic
encourage the idea that each topic is separate and distinct. While it may seem
trivial, signaling to the student that, for example, family structure and sexual
intimacy are two separate topics likely impacts how the student perceives those
topics and their relationship to each other.
This signaling can have deleterious effects. Most importantly, presenting the
cases in a topical, and thus possibly non-chronological order 9 sends the message
that the cases do not build on each other, but rather stand independently. It thus
discourages students from considering how a decision flows or deviates from
precedent. More generally, it makes it impossible—or at least much harder—for
students to perceive the Court’s doctrinal evolution. Consider, for example, a
tour through substantive due process that considers Lawrence v. Texas 10 before
Washington v. Glucksberg, 11 as several leading casebooks do. A student
encountering the cases in that order would find it much harder to appreciate both
the current state of substantive due process law and, more particularly, how
Lawrence’s methodology deviated so markedly from the Burger and early-mid
Rehnquist Courts’ insistence on precise identification of the due process interest
at stake, as exemplified in cases such as Bowers v. Hardwick, 12 Michael H. v.
Gerald D., 13 and Glucksberg 14 itself.
To be sure, some topic-based grouping is appropriate. For example,
discussing Roe v. Wade 15 but then waiting several classes before following up
with Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey 16 might well
confuse students, who won’t have the benefit of immediate recall when they
analyze and evaluate Casey’s engagement with Roe. Moreover, abortion is
arguably sui generis, given both the unique burdens pregnancy and childbirth
impose on women and the uniquely compelling interests that states assert in

7. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 705–06 (1997).
8. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2593 (2015); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374,
375 (1978).
9. Of course, a book might intentionally or simply accidentally order the topics
chronologically. But this structure risks disruption by the happenstance of the Court deciding a new
case on a topic that appears earlier in the book. See infra text accompanying note 34.
10. 539 U.S. 558.
11. 521 U.S. 702.
12. 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986).
13. 491 U.S. 110, 120–21 (1989).
14. 521 U.S. at 720–21.
15. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
16. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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protecting potential life. 17 More generally, some topic-based categorizing is
probably quite helpful for most students. Approaches that eschew such
categorization—for example, those that present a purely historical, period-based
approach to constitutional law—may well reveal fascinating insights to scholars
and others who already understand the basic doctrine. However, for all but the
most insightful neophytes, such an advanced tour will likely lack the needed
intuitive, accessible, topic-grounded doctrinal context.
II. A METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH TO TEACHING THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT
Another approach to teaching constitutional law in general, and the
Fourteenth Amendment in particular, is to focus on the methodologies the Court
has employed to address these issues. 18 The Fourteenth Amendment is a
particularly hospitable field for such an approach: in writing opinions in
substantive due process and equal protection cases the Court has often been quite
explicit about the approaches it is adopting (or rejecting), and the debates among
the Justices often center on exactly those decisions. 19 Thus, focusing pedagogy
on those methodologies allows students to observe the Court’s decisional
process, in a context in which choices about that process are central to the
Court’s resolution of the case. In short, method matters in Fourteenth
Amendment adjudication, and the cases often allow students to experience
17. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 96–99 (1st ed.
1990); see also Casey, 505 U.S. at 852.
18. An important caveat that should be raised at the start of this discussion is that this Essay
does not engage the merits of presenting an originalist or non-originalist approach to constitutional
interpretation. To be sure, debates over such methodologies occupy a great deal of scholarly
attention, attention that presumably seeps into decisions about how and what to teach. However,
this Essay takes as a given the imperative to teach the Constitution largely as the Court has
interpreted it. Indeed, the very idea of a “casebook” implies that the law is generally what the cases
say it is. Of course, books and instructors may still wish to recognize both disputes about originalist
versus non-originalist interpretive methodology as well as the components of the Constitution that,
by being textually unambiguous, are unlitigated. For a brief discussion about teaching the
unlitigated portions of the Constitution, see Michael Dimino, Should Constitutional Law Teach the
Constitution?, PRAWFSBLAWG (Dec. 26, 2007, 4:55 PM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfs
blawg/2007/12/should-constitu.html [https://perma.cc/4XUM-QZRV]. But because the vast
majority of most instructional materials in constitutional law classes do focus on the cases, this
Essay does so as well, as opposed to, say, historical material suggesting the original meaning of a
given constitutional provision.
19. Compare Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 137–41 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(criticizing Justice Scalia’s reliance on history and tradition to determine due process liberty
interests), with id. at 128 n.6 (plurality opinion) (responding to Justice Brennan’s criticism). See,
e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602 (2015) (explaining, in a majority opinion written
by Justice Kennedy, why the Court’s method of identifying the due process interest at issue in that
case legitimately differed from the Court’s method in Glucksberg, a majority opinion that Justice
Kennedy joined).
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methodological choices in action—but only if the presentation of those cases
reveals those choices.
A.

Defining and Defending This Approach

Simply put, a methodological approach is one that focuses on the
methodologies the Court employs to decide a particular type of constitutional
claim. In the context of the Fourteenth Amendment, this approach would, for
example, group equal protection cases and topics by whether the Court analyzed
them through the lens of Carolene Products 20-style political process
reasoning. 21 In turn, within such a grouping it would present those topics
chronologically, to the extent possible.
This method provides several pedagogical benefits. It gives students an
opportunity to examine how the same methodology—e.g., political process
reasoning—guided the Court’s thinking across otherwise distinct types of
discrimination claims. To the extent the cases employing that methodology can
be presented chronologically, they also provide students with a chance to
consider how the Court used precedent from one area (e.g., sex discrimination)
to analyze cases in another (e.g., legitimacy discrimination). 22 The chronological
presentation of these topics (and of the cases within the topics) also allows the
student to observe when an approach encountered resistance or obstacles, or
otherwise started to decay. 23
Consider these benefits. In addition to learning “the rule” about, say,
legitimacy discrimination, a student learning from a methodologicallyorganized set of materials is exposed to the process by which the Court confronts
20. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
21. See ARAIZA, supra note 1, at 699–768. Of course, the Court has at times employed
approaches other than political process reasoning. But because many types of discrimination were
recognized by the Court as raising substantial equal protection questions during the 1970s, the
period when this reasoning was quite influential, political process reasoning can helpfully serve as
a reference point for thinking about modern equal protection law, even when the Court has not
employed it, for example, in the context of race discrimination in general and affirmative action in
particular. See infra text accompanying notes 44, 55, 56.
22. See, e.g., Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 506 (1976) (declining to accord explicitly
heightened scrutiny to legitimacy classifications based on a comparison of “the severity or
pervasiveness of the historic legal and political discrimination” faced by persons born to an
unmarried couple, as compared with the discrimination historically imposed on women and African
Americans (citing Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684–86 (1973) (plurality opinion))); see
also ARAIZA, supra note 1, at 741 (presenting this excerpt from Lucas).
23. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr. Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 442–46 (1985)
(expressing reluctance to grant the intellectually disabled suspect or quasi-suspect class status in
part because of concerns about judicial competence to apply such scrutiny to medical and scientific
issues such as intellectual disability). For an example of how a chronological approach makes these
insights possible in the due process context, see supra text accompanying note 19 (recounting how
the Court in Obergefell explained its decision not to employ the due process methodology employed
in an earlier majority opinion which Obergefell’s author joined).
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an entire area of law at a given point in time, for example, equal protection at a
time when social movements were beginning seriously to press equality claims
that extended beyond race. That exposure in turn allows them to witness the
more granular process by which the Court applies that general approach to the
particular facts of the case, or, in the equal protection context, the type of
discrimination at issue. 24 In addition, it reveals that process in a way that gives
students a chance to experience and critique the Court’s use of precedent—a
basic legal reasoning skill. 25 Finally, this type of presentation allows students to
experience the Court working through the implications of a particular
methodology and, if those implications prove to be problematic, to witness the
Court’s (or individual Justices’) critiques and retreats. 26
By contrast, a student studying equal protection through a strict topic-bytopic approach receives the message that different types of discrimination are
distinct and have no relationship to each other. For example, such a casebook
might lead off its equal protection materials with extended discussions of the
Court’s treatment of race and sex, and perhaps move from there to ancillary
(though important) issues such as the intent requirement, before presenting other
types of discrimination in a catch-all section that walls them off from any
doctrinal connection to the Court’s race and sex jurisprudence. In such a case,
the student may learn “the rule” for a given type of discrimination, and they may
even learn how that rule has evolved over time. But any larger learning
opportunity is lost. 27

24. See, e.g., Lucas, 427 U.S. at 504–05, 510–11.
25. See, e.g., ARAIZA, supra note 1, at 748–49 (prompting students to consider this question
in the context of the legitimacy cases’ application of Frontiero).
26. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 574–75 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(suggesting that standard political process-based criteria would counsel downgrading judicial
review of sex discrimination claims to review for mere rationality); Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 445
(expressing the Court’s reluctance to apply political process reasoning to grant heightened scrutiny
to intellectual disability discrimination); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 290
(1978) (rejecting a Carolene Products-based political process approach to determining whether
affirmative action policies should be subjected to strict scrutiny); see also ARAIZA, supra note 1,
at 733–34 (excerpting the portion of Justice Scalia’s dissent from Virginia cited above); id. at 918
(excerpting the discussion from Cleburne cited above); id. at 810–11 (excerpting the discussion
from Bakke cited above).
27. To be sure, the imperative to keep reading assignments (and thus casebooks) to a
manageable length often prevents books from providing a detailed recounting of the evolution of a
particular doctrine. For example, it is not unusual for casebooks to limit their presentation of
alienage or legitimacy classifications to one excerpted case, supplemented by a note. A
methodological approach allows the student to witness that evolution in the broader context of the
Court’s thinking about political process reasoning. For example, a student could encounter an early,
enthusiastic example of such reasoning in Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 690–91 (plurality opinion), and
then be able to compare it with the Court’s reluctance to embrace such reasoning a dozen years
later in Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 432, 445–46 (“[I]f the large and amorphous class of the mentally
retarded were deemed quasi-suspect for the reasons given by the Court of Appeals, it would be

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2018]

IF IT’S TUESDAY, THIS MUST BE PROCREATION

629

Due process is another doctrinal area where this approach could be useful.
It is commonplace for constitutional law casebooks to organize the canonical
due process cases by the right at issue: for example, procreation, abortion, family
structure, sexual intimacy, assisted suicide, and marriage. As innocuous as it
may sound, that categorization sends an unhelpful message to students—a
message, in effect, that “if this is Tuesday, we must be studying the due process
law of family structure.” 28 In a sense, of course, that would be an accurate
statement of a class session that focused on Moore v. City of East Cleveland. 29
But to so describe that session is unhelpful on several levels.
First, it sends a message that, regardless of whatever else happened in due
process jurisprudence since Moore in 1977, “the due process law of family
structure” is still that stated by Moore (perhaps as modified by Michael H.). That
message is simply wrong-headed. To ignore post-Moore and Michael H. cases
that considered different topics—Casey, Glucksberg, Lawrence, and
Obergefell—on the theory that those later cases are “not about” family structure
suggests to students that those later cases add nothing to the law of family
structure handed down in Moore and Michael H. That is surely incorrect.
Unfortunately, this type of structure, and the resulting muddled messaging, is
common.
Second, and closely related to the first point, this approach has only a
random relationship to the evolution of the Court’s thinking about due process
rights. Unless the topics themselves are organized in a way that reflects the
chronology of the Court’s cases, a topic-by-topic approach gives students no
sense of how the Court has thought about, 30 built on, 31 modified, 32 and even
difficult to find a principled way to distinguish a variety of other groups who have perhaps
immutable disabilities setting them off from others, who cannot themselves mandate the desired
legislative responses, and who can claim some degree of prejudice from at least part of the public
at large. One need mention in this respect only the aging, the disabled, the mentally ill, and the
infirm. We are reluctant to set out on that course, and we decline to do so.”). A book that isn’t
aware of this comparison may not present those topics chronologically, or may do so simply by
accident. By contrast, a book that is organized along methodological (and, within methodology,
along chronological) lines allows the student to make this comparison. Indeed, the very
organization of the book prompts the student to do exactly that.
28. Compare to Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 501 (1981), a First
Amendment case that states: “We deal here with the law of billboards.”
29. 431 U.S. 494, 495 (1977).
30. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 752, 762–63 (Souter, J., concurring)
(providing a lengthy analysis of Justice Harlan’s due process approach in his dissent in Poe v.
Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961)).
31. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 121–24 (1989) (plurality opinion)
(relying on Justice Powell’s opinion in Moore to justify its narrow definition of the due process
right at issue).
32. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602 (2015) (explaining why
Glucksberg’s methodology for identifying due process rights may not always be the appropriate
one).
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repudiated 33 its prior thinking about due process. For example, it is not
uncommon for casebooks to present Glucksberg (1997) after Lawrence (2003).
Any student whose final encounter of the semester with substantive due process
is with Glucksberg is not being well-positioned to think about the current status
and future trajectory of substantive due process.
But even books that do manage to organize their topics in a way that reflects
the chronology of their decision risk finding that structure compromised when
the Court decides a new due process case. For example, books already in print
when Obergefell was decided in 2015 face an unpleasant choice. Either they
have to tack that case onto the end of the substantive due process chapter, even
if the relevant topic (the right to marriage) came much earlier in the chapter, or
they need to direct users to read Obergefell as part of the marriage rights material
that came earlier in the chapter, even if that results in the Court’s most recent
statement on due process being presented early in the chapter, and not, as is more
appropriate, as the chapter’s coda. 34
Concededly, a pure methodological/chronological approach 35 is not perfect.
If the Court decides a case about a particular due process right and then returns
to that exact same issue after deciding intervening due process cases on other
topics, it may be appropriate to pair those two cases to allow students to compare
the Court’s two analyses of that identical issue. In addition to abortion, as noted
earlier, 36 this issue arises when one considers Bowers v. Hardwick, decided in
1986, and Lawrence v. Texas, decided in 2003. Because Michael H. v. Gerald
D., decided in 1989, Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey, decided in 1992, and Washington v. Glucksberg, decided in 1997,
intervene chronologically between these two cases, a strict chronological
approach would direct students to read Bowers, then Michael H., Casey,
Glucksberg, and, finally, Lawrence.
To be sure, there is something to be said for such an uncompromisingly
chronological approach. After all, Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion in Michael
H. and Chief Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion in Glucksberg follow Bowers
in their narrow approach to defining the right at issue; indeed, in Michael H.
33. Compare, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571–72 (2003) (asserting that the laws
and traditions of the past half century are most relevant in determining the constitutionallyprotected status of a claimed liberty interest), with id. at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[A]n
‘emerging awareness’ is by definition not ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition[s],’
as we have said ‘fundamental right’ status requires.”).
34. Compare ARAIZA, supra note 1, at 642–65 (presenting Obergefell as the last excerpted
case in the chronological order of the due process cases the book presents), with id. at 665–66
(providing final thoughts and questions for students to consider in light of those cases, culminating
in Obergefell).
35. In the case of unenumerated substantive due process rights, a methodological approach—
here, an approach that focuses on the Court’s decisional method for identifying the right and
scrutinizing its infringement—melds into a chronological approach.
36. See supra text accompanying notes 15–17.
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Justice Scalia defends that approach by expressly invoking Bowers (among other
cases) in his famous footnote 6. 37 Similarly, the Chief Justice’s opinion in
Glucksberg attempts to explain why the lower court erred in relying on Casey as
authority for construing the claimed “right to die” broadly rather than
narrowly. 38 These examples reveal the potential utility of insisting on a strict
chronological reading that allows students to follow the doctrinal progression as
it occurs. Nevertheless, sometimes that approach should give way. For example,
given the closely-related subjects addressed in Bowers and Lawrence—indeed,
given that the latter overruled the former—it may be appropriate to relax this
insistence in that case. 39 But the Bowers-Lawrence exception itself serves the
purpose of the general chronological rule, as it allows students to consider how
the latter case deals with, and decides to reject, the Bowers precedent.
In sum, a methodological approach, supplemented by subsidiary
organization along chronological and/or subject-matter lines when
appropriate, 40 allows students to see “the big picture” of constitutional law,
while still learning how the Court decides particular cases and treats particular
subject-matter.
B.

The Challenge of Race

To repeat, none of this is to suggest that the methodological approach is
perfect. If one compares that approach to one that focuses on subject-matter, it
becomes clear that race looms as the primary challenge for the methodological
approach. The topic of racial discrimination stands apart as one that, in and of
itself, should matter for Fourteenth Amendment pedagogy. As a historical
matter, racial equality was the primary focus of the drafters and ratifiers of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 41 From a contemporary perspective, race remains the
primary challenge to Americans’ aspirations to “the equal protection of the
37. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989) (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist,
C.J.).
38. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 726–28 (1997).
39. See ARAIZA, supra note 1, at 624–26 (presenting a note on Bowers after a sequence of due
process cases ending with Glucksberg, and immediately before presenting an excerpt from
Lawrence).
40. A subject-matter approach would not make sense when the Court’s modern jurisprudence
does not include more than one, or perhaps two, cases on that subject. In such a case, as, for
example, with substantive due process, it makes more sense simply to focus on the chronological
evolution of the Court’s thinking about due process methodology without artificially creating
subject-matter categories consisting of only one or two cases. By contrast, when the Court has
decided multiple cases involving particular subject-matter, subject-matter may function as an
appropriate second order categorization tool. For example, the fact that the Court has decided
multiple cases on sex, alienage, and legitimacy discrimination justifies use of those categories as
second order categorizations.
41. See Paul Finkelman, Original Intent and the Fourteenth Amendment: Into the Blackhole
of Constitutional Law, 89 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1019, 1029, 1037, 1040 (2014).
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laws.” If any “mere” subject-matter merits pedagogical treatment as its own
category, surely race does.
Yes—but with a caveat. For all the reasons just stated, race does merit
standalone treatment as a subject-matter category. But at the same time, it
disserves students to divorce that topic entirely from the methodological
approach. After all, during the police power era of Fourteenth Amendment
jurisprudence, the Court considered race issues through the lens of the legitimate
police power of the state. 42 It’s also been established that Justice Stone had
race—and, in particular, the status of African Americans—in mind when he
drafted Footnote 4 of Carolene Products. 43 The key affirmative action cases of
the 1970s and 1980s engaged, at least in passing, John Hart Ely’s argument that
Carolene Products-style political process reasoning favored more deferential
judicial review of this type of race consciousness. 44 These examples suggest that
even a question as important as racial equality cannot be examined in isolation
from the underlying methodological currents that influenced Supreme Court
doctrine at any given point in the Court’s history.
This is not common pedagogical wisdom. Casebooks often lump together
the Court’s canonical race cases—among them the Civil Rights Cases,45
Plessy, 46 Brown v. Board of Education, 47 Loving v. Virginia, 48 Bakke, 49 J.A.
Croson Co., 50 and Grutter v. Bollinger 51—without so much as a nod toward the
vastly different methodological contexts from which they arose. While
unfortunate, this phenomenon is understandable. Because race is the central
concern of the Fourteenth Amendment (or at least of the Equal Protection
Clause), it’s not surprising that the race cases are presented together. But
students presented with these vastly different opinions without also being
provided with any sense of those underlying contexts will likely find themselves
lost. At the least, the lack of methodological context may lead them to apply

42. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 544 (1896); see also Michael Klarman, An
Interpretive History of Modern Equal Protection, 90 MICH. L. REV. 213, 229–30 (1991). For an
example of how a contemporary of the Plessy Court used police power reasoning to explain a state
court decision upholding an ordinance requiring residential segregation, see Recent Case, Harris v.
City of Louisville, 177 S.W. (Ky.) 142, 25 YALE L.J. 81, 81–82 (1915).
43. See, e.g., Klarman, supra note 42, at 226–27.
44. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493–97 (1989); Regents of the
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 290 (1978); see also John Hart Ely, The Constitutionality of
Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 723, 726–27 (1974) (offering a political processgrounded justification for race-based affirmative action).
45. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
46. 163 U.S. 537.
47. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
48. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
49. 438 U.S. 265.
50. 488 U.S. 469.
51. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
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their presentist doctrinal preconceptions to what must be partly understood as
historical documents reflecting those Justices’ methodological and
jurisprudential commitments. For example, the lack of such context may prompt
students to ask why the Court failed to apply strict scrutiny to the Louisiana
segregation ordinance in Plessy, ignoring the fact that that concept—and indeed
the entire enterprise of tiered scrutiny—lay decades in the future. 52 This is not
to suggest that students should be dissuaded from passing moral judgment on
earlier cases. Plessy can (and should) be understood as being “wrong the day it
was decided.” 53 But as part of that act of moral judgment, students should be
made to understand and appreciate the jurisprudential world of the Plessy Court,
just as students reading Bakke should understand why the Court in that case
declined to embrace the political process reasoning that was then at its zenith.
How can a book (and an instructor) do this, consistent with the imperative
to treat race as distinct topic? The solution requires a compromise. The Court’s
race jurisprudence should permeate a book’s presentation of the Court’s
Fourteenth Amendment doctrine—in particular, its equal protection doctrine.
But that jurisprudence should be understood as a reflection of the Court’s larger
worldview at that time. Thus, students exposed to Plessy should have a sense of
the Court’s more general police power-based jurisprudence as it then existed.54
Similarly, students reading Brown should have already been exposed to Footnote
4, so they can consider why the Court did not use political process reasoning to
conclude that the political exclusion and social oppression of African Americans
in 1954 justified the strictest review of separate-but-equal. 55 Conversely,
students studying affirmative action should also have been exposed to Footnote
4, so they can ask the reverse question: why that same political process tool did
not justify more lenient review of the University of California’s or the City of
Richmond’s race-based set-asides in Bakke or Croson, respectively. 56 In other
words, a presentation of methodology should accompany the race cases, in order
to allow students to both understand and critique them.
52. See William D. Araiza, The Section 5 Power and the Rational Basis Standard of Equal
Protection, 79 TUL. L. REV. 519, 531, 583–84 (2005).
53. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 863 (1992).
54. See, e.g., ARAIZA, supra note 1, at 671–81 (presenting the Court’s police power
jurisprudence before the race cases); id. at 681–82 (discussing the Court’s use of police power
reasoning in Plessy before presenting Plessy in detail).
55. See, e.g., ARAIZA, supra note 1, at 699–701 (presenting Footnote 4 before the race cases);
id. at 701–04 (discussing the Court’s failure to employ Footnote 4-type reasoning to the race cases
it decided up to and including Brown, before presenting Brown in detail); Klarman, supra note 42,
at 226–40 (discussing the Court’s failure to use political process reasoning to decide Brown and
other race cases during the 1940s and 1950s).
56. See, e.g., ARAIZA, supra note 1, at 699–701 (presenting Footnote 4 before the race cases);
id. at 701–04 (noting the failure of the majority coalitions in the foundational affirmative action
cases to do serious Footnote 4 analyses when evaluating affirmative action plans, before presenting
those cases in detail).
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This solution thus weaves the Court’s discussion of race into that
methodological approach. For example, its presentation of the police power
approach to the Fourteenth Amendment should explain how the Plessy Court
decided that streetcar segregation was a legitimate police power regulation. 57
Similarly, its explanation of political process theory should note the Court’s
failure to use such reasoning either to strike down segregation or, conversely, to
review race-conscious affirmative action more leniently. 58
But by itself this approach is insufficient. Given the centrality of race, it
behooves instructors also to present the race cases together. But students can
appreciate the sweep of the Court’s race jurisprudence only after they’ve come
to understand the interpretive methodologies the Court has employed over the
course of its history. Thus, as counter-intuitive as it sounds, this unified
presentation of the race cases should occur only later in the discussion of equal
protection. 59 But far from demoting race from its central position in Fourteenth
Amendment jurisprudence, this move reflects its importance—in particular, the
importance of appreciating how the Court understood its interpretive task at the
moments it confronted what eventually became the canonical race cases.
C. Why Not Only History?
The argument thus far inevitably raises a follow-up question: If the Court’s
methodology is all, or almost all, that should matter, then why not go all in? In
other words, why shouldn’t a book—or a survey course in constitutional law—
simply focus on historical periodization and the methodologies the Court
employed to decide cases during particular periods? Such a purely historical
approach risks confusing students—most of whom are seriously encountering
the Constitution for the first time—by embedding doctrinal study within
historical periods before they have learned the doctrinal basics. Just like a firsttime visitor to Europe who is shown an eighteenth-century palace and then
whisked to a performance of a Hadyn symphony and is expected to appreciate
the parallels, so too most first-year law students encountering the Constitution
for the first time can’t fairly be expected to see, for example, the parallels
between the Lochner-era Court’s Commerce Clause and Fourteenth Amendment
jurisprudence. Eventually, as the tourist/student gains expertise, we can expect
her to develop an appreciation for the artistic or jurisprudential parallels within
a period. But, for all but the most talented neophytes, it takes work before that
can happen.
Moreover, and happily, grouping cases by the highest, most general, or
theoretical levels of methodology is unnecessary for students to obtain the
advantages of a methodological approach. This is because the Court’s
57. Id. at 681–82.
58. Id. at 701–04.
59. See, e.g., id. at 769 (first page of the chapter devoted to race).
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methodologies for deciding different types of constitutional cases have diverged
to the point that an instructor can still get the benefits of a methodological
approach while respecting doctrinal boundaries. For example, while at a high
level of theory one can draw parallels between the modern Court’s Commerce
Clause and equal protection jurisprudence, those two doctrinal areas have
become sufficiently methodologically distinct 60 that a student can study and
learn about equal protection decisional methodologies while remaining within
the boundaries of cases that will strike the student as intuitively related, because
they all deal with discrimination. In short, the methodological approach provides
pedagogical benefits within the parameters of subject-matter delineated (and
thus intuitively-accessible) doctrines, broadly construed.
D. Looking Forward: Animus as a Methodology
A methodological approach can look forward as well as backward—it can
give students an opportunity to think about doctrinal evolution as it is happening.
By presenting cases according to their methodology, books and instructors can
highlight the Court’s evolving direction.
Consider animus. 61 The extraordinary string of victories won by gay rights
plaintiffs over the course of the last two decades 62 has largely been based on the
Court’s conclusion that the challenged government actions were based on
unconstitutional animus. 63 Presenting those cases together, and linking them to
earlier cases that had reached similar conclusions in the contexts of other types
of discrimination, 64 allows students to experience the trajectory of equal
protection law over the last three decades. 65 It also encourages them to speculate
about its future, in a way that would be far more difficult if, for example, Romer

60. Aziz Z. Huq, Tiers of Scrutiny in Enumerated Powers Jurisprudence, 80 U. CHI. L. REV.
575, 576–77 (2013).
61. See, e.g., WILLIAM D. ARAIZA, ANIMUS: A SHORT INTRODUCTION TO BIAS IN THE LAW
3 (2017). For a more skeptical view of the usefulness of that concept, see Stephen D. Smith, The
Jurisprudence of Denigration, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 675, 698–99 (2014).
62. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2682 (2013); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558,
579 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635–36 (1996); see also
also Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015).
63. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693–95; Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 583–84 (O’Connor, J.,
concurring); Romer, 517 U.S. at 632. Even Obergefell, in some ways, can be understood as an
animus case. See ARAIZA, supra note 61, at 163–72.
64. See, e.g., ARAIZA, supra note 1, at 911–51 (presenting the animus cases in a separate
chapter).
65. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr. Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985) (“The short
of it is that requiring the permit in this case appears to us to rest on an irrational prejudice against
the mentally retarded . . . .”); U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973) (“[I]f the
constitutional conception of ‘equal protection of the laws’ means anything, it must at the very least
mean that a bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a
legitimate governmental interest.”).
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v. Evans 66 and City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center 67 were siloed in
separate sub-chapters entitled, respectively, “sexual orientation discrimination”
and “intellectual disability discrimination.”
Indeed, the rise of animus can be seen as a response to the decline of suspect
class analysis (at least at the Supreme Court). 68 Presenting the animus cases after
the cases in which the Court employed suspect class/tiered scrutiny analysis, and
in some ways as a response to the decline of suspect class analysis at the Court,
allows students to witness the ongoing evolution of Supreme Court doctrine. 69
By contrast, the type of siloing critiqued here has the effect of discouraging
students from discovering both the commonalities and the evolving doctrinal
pathways that actually do much of the Court’s real work, both historically and
today.
III. BACK TO SIENA
Return to the tourism analogy that opened this Essay and inspired its title.
What would be the shape of a European tour that followed the methodological
approach this Essay has sketched out? Just as with a survey course in
constitutional law, the challenge of a whirlwind tour of Europe includes not just
deciding what material to omit from the itinerary, but also organizing the
remainder for maximum appreciation and comprehension. This Essay has
argued for organizational principles that go beyond mere locations or subjectmatter.
At this point, the analogy between touring and studying becomes less
precise. Touring requires a physical presence at the sight. This reality necessarily
limits the thematic quality of a given itinerary, at least if the tour guide aspires
to provide a reasonably comprehensive overview of the continent. Thus, while
the closest tourism analogy to the methodological approach might be a tour that,
for example, spent one week focusing on Baroque architecture across the
continent, subdivided into days that focused on religious, civic, and royal
66. 517 U.S. 620.
67. 473 U.S. 432.
68. See generally ARAIZA, supra note 61. To be sure, lower federal courts and state courts
have continued to consider if particular groups should be considered suspect classes. See, e.g.,
SmithKline Beecham v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471, 474 (9th Cir. 2014); Varnum v. Brien, 763
N.W.2d 862, 880 (Iowa 2009).
69. See ARAIZA, supra note 1, at 911–51. Cleburne in particular presents a wonderful
opportunity to present this transition, given its tentative, skeptical application of suspect class
analysis followed by its application of rationality review which culminated in its conclusion that
animus infected the government’s decision. This is not, however, to suggest that the Justices
intended to create a logical connection between these two parts of the opinion. See William D.
Araiza, Was Cleburne an Accident?, 19 U. PA. J. CON. L. 621, 668–69 (2017) (tracing the history
of the Justices’ deliberations in Cleburne and concluding that they did not intend the Court’s
rejection of heightened scrutiny for the intellectually disabled to logically segue into its heightened
rationality review of the challenged discrimination).
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structures, the travel required to sort tour stops along those lines makes such an
itinerary impracticable. Legal study does not suffer from such constraints. Thus,
for example, grouping equal protection law according to decisional
methodology, and within each methodology sub-grouping by topic area, is
feasible in a way that organizing tour days by architectural period is not.
Nevertheless, a survey course in constitutional law confronts a somewhat
analogous practicability challenge. Both first-time European tourists and firsttime students of the Fourteenth Amendment operate under severe knowledge
constraints. For that reason, methodological approaches—whether to
architecture or legal doctrine—must be combined with approaches that provide
information in a more intuitive, accessible way. For a first-time European tourist,
this might require opening the bus doors at the main piazza in Siena, and
pointing out different architectural styles within the context of categories the
tourist might find more intuitive—first, the city hall and the monastery down the
street, both Romanesque, then the cathedral, constructed in High Gothic, and
finally the market building and later additions to the cathedral, both done in the
Renaissance style.
Similarly, for first-time students of the Fourteenth Amendment, the bus
doors might open onto the Equal Protection Clause, and the tour guide/professor
might wish to point out the Court’s police power analysis in Plessy, its political
process reasoning in cases from the 1970s and rejection of such reasoning in
Bakke and Croson, and, finally, its animus reasoning in Cleburne and the gay
rights cases. In such tours, the tourist/student is told more than “Here we are in
Siena” or “Here we are in sex discrimination.” Instead, she is given a deeper
context beyond that mere place-name or subject-matter. With luck, that
methodological context will allow her to remember more than the day of the
week she visited Siena or read Frontiero.
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